Slote and Deliberation I
Most accounts of ethics, whether utilitarian, deontological, or Aristotelian, are grounded in something external to the agent (pleasure/pain, God, etc.) Michael Slote takes a completely different position in Morals from Motives. He attempts to create a comprehensive account of morality that is based within the agent in his motives. Drawing on feminist ethics, Slote argues that we can distill everything morally admirable down to the motive of benevolence, specifically partialistic caring. I admire and support his efforts. Slote’s position seems to arise from the Aristotelian notion of the health of the soul. For Aristotle, a moral awareness is required on the part of agent: the virtuous agent is the agent who can see what the correct action in a situation is. Virtuous action is non-codifiable. This move away from rules by Aristotle is continued, in a sense, by Slote. Just as Aristotle did not believe in being guided by a code, Slote does not believe we should be guided by a principle. His attempt is an intriguing and potentially plausible interpretation of the Golden Rule.
However, there is at least one aspect of his theory I have trouble with. He believes that the most moral people are those that do not need to deliberate on what to do, but can intuit the moral action, even in the most difficult of situations. I disagree with this; probably in part because of my strong libertarian streak. My view is that there are two types of situations in which morality applies: analytic situations and situations that require use of perception and deliberation on the part of the agent. Any situation in which the correct action cannot be understood merely from the definition of the terms used must be deliberated upon. (I owe a nod to Jim Ryan in helping me articulate my view.)
Slote offers two situations in support of his theory. They are both classic moral examples. The first example is that of Stocker’s hospital visit, and the second Bernard Williams’ “one thought too many” case. I will discuss Slote’s interpretation of Stocker’s case first.
Stocker noted that if a person, when explaining to his hospitalized friend why he came, invoked an abstract moral principle, he would be seen callous and not nearly as praiseworthy as the friend who visited from a motivation of benevolent feeling. Slote believes that this tension between theory and actions is endemic to all philosophies of morality. What motivates us should not always be moral theory. Some parts of morality, like moral theory, exist to examine the actions after the fact.
I agree with Slote that this tension exists with all theories of morality, but I dispute the location of its origin. A friend who invokes a moral principle as the reason for his visit is not less praiseworthy because he came on account of the moral principle. The reduction of moral worth is due to conversational implicature. To invoke a theory of morality in everyday conversation as motivation implies an unwanted duty. The friend who just says he came because he is a friend unequivocally expresses that his actions are voluntary. It is the clarity of voluntariness that we find so appealing in the second case. I take it as a self-evident proposition that a moral action is never more praiseworthy when it is involuntary than when it is voluntary.
However, there is at least one aspect of his theory I have trouble with. He believes that the most moral people are those that do not need to deliberate on what to do, but can intuit the moral action, even in the most difficult of situations. I disagree with this; probably in part because of my strong libertarian streak. My view is that there are two types of situations in which morality applies: analytic situations and situations that require use of perception and deliberation on the part of the agent. Any situation in which the correct action cannot be understood merely from the definition of the terms used must be deliberated upon. (I owe a nod to Jim Ryan in helping me articulate my view.)
Slote offers two situations in support of his theory. They are both classic moral examples. The first example is that of Stocker’s hospital visit, and the second Bernard Williams’ “one thought too many” case. I will discuss Slote’s interpretation of Stocker’s case first.
Stocker noted that if a person, when explaining to his hospitalized friend why he came, invoked an abstract moral principle, he would be seen callous and not nearly as praiseworthy as the friend who visited from a motivation of benevolent feeling. Slote believes that this tension between theory and actions is endemic to all philosophies of morality. What motivates us should not always be moral theory. Some parts of morality, like moral theory, exist to examine the actions after the fact.
I agree with Slote that this tension exists with all theories of morality, but I dispute the location of its origin. A friend who invokes a moral principle as the reason for his visit is not less praiseworthy because he came on account of the moral principle. The reduction of moral worth is due to conversational implicature. To invoke a theory of morality in everyday conversation as motivation implies an unwanted duty. The friend who just says he came because he is a friend unequivocally expresses that his actions are voluntary. It is the clarity of voluntariness that we find so appealing in the second case. I take it as a self-evident proposition that a moral action is never more praiseworthy when it is involuntary than when it is voluntary.
posted by Joshua Frear at 2:35 PM
|
<< Home