Slote and Deliberation II
The other example Slote offers is Williams’ scenario of the man who sees his wife and a stranger drowning. He can only save one, since there is only one life preserver. The husband pauses to ponder what his moral obligations and permissions are. Having settled the question in favor of saving his wife, the man throws the life preserver to his wife. Slote claims that this situation shows us that moral permissions and obligations should ideally be independent of moral thinking. We should just intuit the moral choice, and not have to deliberate. The husband is morally deficient for having deliberated.
This is a analytical situation; it is obvious that the husband must throw the preserver to his wife. Any deliberation in this situation can be assumed to be a function of the weakness of the husband’s will. There are two opportunities for deliberation, and Slote conflates them. Sometimes the agent must stop and deliberate about what the right action is (deliberation-1), and sometimes the agent will stop and deliberate whether to do the right action after he has determined what it is (deliberation-2). Deliberation-1 is necessary in any non-analytic moral situation and deliberation-2 concerns the virtuousness of the agent. The virtuousness of the agent is not dependent on his ability to figure out what is the right thing to do; it is dependent on his doing it wholeheartedly and quickly after deliberation. The most virtuous agent is of one mind and one will.
As we can see, once again, the scenario is better explained by the admirability of voluntariness. Voluntariness contains connotations (if not strict denotations) of wholeheartedness. Williams’ situation is not a difficult moral quandary; rather, it is presumably the clearest possible that he could think of. Only the shortest moment of thought is required to understand the situation and act. Anyone who hesitates when in this situation can be assumed to be in the midst of the deliberation-2 and have a divided will. In essence, Slote is not playing fairly. He picks an example of deliberation2 to prove that deliberation-1 is less praiseworthy. We do not need philosophy to help us with intuitive, analytic situations. The quandaries are where we need the aid of moral theory.
It may be objected that Slote’s intention was to extrapolate and thus claim that the virtuousness of the agent is correlated with the moral difficulty of the situations that the agent can solve intuitively. This extrapolation, however, is lacking in data points. Slote needs at least one more situation, one in which about half of us would act correctly intuitively. I believe that there are no such situations and that rather, discovering the moral action in some situations is intuitive, and in others, it requires deliberation. There is no middle ground for intuition. Habituation is a complex issue that I won't cover here, except to say that at least in the beginning of habit-forming, deliberation must occur.
The lack of hesitation that Slote and others find appealing comes from the unification of the will to do the right action. The time here is on a gradient correlated with the virtuousness of the agent. The most virtuous agent has no second thoughts for anything but benevolence. Moral theory is still important for action; indeed, even the most virtuous are aware of it every time they face a dilemma. I will also note that deliberation-1 could be very quick for some of the ideally moral agents.
Why do I care so much about this (somewhat minor) part of Slote's theory? I think it is because my personal experience has led me to deep beliefs about the vital nature of voluntariness, deliberation, and intentionality in ethics.
This is a analytical situation; it is obvious that the husband must throw the preserver to his wife. Any deliberation in this situation can be assumed to be a function of the weakness of the husband’s will. There are two opportunities for deliberation, and Slote conflates them. Sometimes the agent must stop and deliberate about what the right action is (deliberation-1), and sometimes the agent will stop and deliberate whether to do the right action after he has determined what it is (deliberation-2). Deliberation-1 is necessary in any non-analytic moral situation and deliberation-2 concerns the virtuousness of the agent. The virtuousness of the agent is not dependent on his ability to figure out what is the right thing to do; it is dependent on his doing it wholeheartedly and quickly after deliberation. The most virtuous agent is of one mind and one will.
As we can see, once again, the scenario is better explained by the admirability of voluntariness. Voluntariness contains connotations (if not strict denotations) of wholeheartedness. Williams’ situation is not a difficult moral quandary; rather, it is presumably the clearest possible that he could think of. Only the shortest moment of thought is required to understand the situation and act. Anyone who hesitates when in this situation can be assumed to be in the midst of the deliberation-2 and have a divided will. In essence, Slote is not playing fairly. He picks an example of deliberation2 to prove that deliberation-1 is less praiseworthy. We do not need philosophy to help us with intuitive, analytic situations. The quandaries are where we need the aid of moral theory.
It may be objected that Slote’s intention was to extrapolate and thus claim that the virtuousness of the agent is correlated with the moral difficulty of the situations that the agent can solve intuitively. This extrapolation, however, is lacking in data points. Slote needs at least one more situation, one in which about half of us would act correctly intuitively. I believe that there are no such situations and that rather, discovering the moral action in some situations is intuitive, and in others, it requires deliberation. There is no middle ground for intuition. Habituation is a complex issue that I won't cover here, except to say that at least in the beginning of habit-forming, deliberation must occur.
The lack of hesitation that Slote and others find appealing comes from the unification of the will to do the right action. The time here is on a gradient correlated with the virtuousness of the agent. The most virtuous agent has no second thoughts for anything but benevolence. Moral theory is still important for action; indeed, even the most virtuous are aware of it every time they face a dilemma. I will also note that deliberation-1 could be very quick for some of the ideally moral agents.
Why do I care so much about this (somewhat minor) part of Slote's theory? I think it is because my personal experience has led me to deep beliefs about the vital nature of voluntariness, deliberation, and intentionality in ethics.
posted by Joshua Frear at 2:32 PM
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