4.18.2005

Compatibilism and Christianity - a response to AJ Armitage

Aaron Armitage, of the excellent blog Calvinist Libertarians, has posted a reply to my initial take on free will. He wants to defend compatibilism from my claims. The thrust of his argument is a strong assertion: compatibilism is required for moral responsibility. He also objects to my second post as attacking a straw man. I am afraid that I have not been as clear as I should in either. This is what comes of a lack of planning.

Aaron starts off by attacking my definition of determinism. I'll try to defend it and clear up any misunderstandings that my readers might have gained.

Aaron's new definition of determinism comes from Dictionary.com: "The philosophical doctrine that every state of affairs, including every human event, act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedent states of affairs."

There are two ways in which determinism can be true. Every event can be deterministically caused, or every event can be known before it happens. My two posts were separated so as to distinguish between the two. Christian and naturalist compatibilists alike can argue that causal determinism is true, but Christian compatibilists can bring to bear another mechanism for determinism: God’s knowledge of the future. As Xon noted in a comment below, it is "accidental" determinism, in some sense. One point on which Aaron is very vague is as to the mechanism for his determinism. He does not believe that either the laws of nature or knowledge of the future is the mechanism.

The state of the world alone is not sufficient to explain determinism. Dictionary.com is silent on this issue probably out of recognition that determinism has room to accommodate many different mechanisms. I should note also that I mean mechanism in a technical philosophical sense, and not as specifically machine-like. The job of a biologist is to explain the mechanism of the fruit from the trees.

Now, onto the arguments. Aaron looks repeatedly to agents post-choice, notes that determinism is required, and then concludes that determinism is required pre-choice. His criticisms miss my argument, but it is most likely my fault for not being clear. So, I will go through his argument and show where I part ways with Aaron. I should note first that I have no objection to the world being deterministic post-choice; it is pre-choice that I believe we need to preserve libertarian free will.

Aaron’s first critique: “...an agent's character, desires, goals, knowledge, and so forth are part of the antecedent state of affairs. How can an agent who doesn't act from his own goals, etc., be said to have free will?”


The mere fact that mental states and dispositions are part of the antecedent state of affairs does not make them deterministic. It seems obvious that after I choose, the link between my choice and my action is causally deterministic. It does not seem obvious that, when faced with multiple sufficient causes or incommensurable belief sets, the choice is determined. There are situations in which two different paths of action can both be consistent with one’s character, some desires, some goals, and so on. Aaron's picture of the human soul seems too simplistic. Why must the outcome of deliberation always be determined before we start?

I noted in an earlier post that an agent could have two sufficient reasons to perform A. Just in the same way, an agent could have a sufficient reason to perform A and a sufficient reason to perform B. Prima facie, this looks like a problem for Aaron.

Aaron’s second critique: “Let's take two hypothetical actors. Bill is a robot. He looks just like a person, but he has no intentions or wishes, and no interior experience of any kind. His programming does take input from sensory data, but this interacts with a complicated algorithm that takes most of its inputs from random quantum events before producing a course of action, which means that Bill behaves randomly. Bob is an ordinary person, but he's a little obsessive. Or rather, a lot obsessive. There's one thing he wants more than anything. Say, a woman. Every day he's eaten up with desire for her. He would, literally, die to get her, and he would consider it the best deal he ever got. She's the only thing he wants or can think of wanting. You get the picture. Now suppose she offered herself to one of them. Bill's "choice" of whether to take her up on it would seem to satisfy the PAP more than Bob's.”


I’ll take these characters one at a time. First, Bill. I do not understand what the problem is with Bill. Sure he satisfies PAP. In fact, Robert Kane might say that, from a purely naturalistic standpoint, Bill is what a free agent would look like. On the natural level, all we can observe in the brain are quantum cascades in neurons. However, PAP is not sufficient for freedom of the will. It is only one of several necessary conditions, another being a will.

Now, Bob. At this point, Bob is clearly not free. If he were to do otherwise, he would be acting out of character. Aaron and I are in agreement so far. Let us rewind the tape of Bob’s life back to when he first gained the desire for this woman. At some point, Bob must choose whether or not to will to pursue this woman. He must go from desire to volition. For, Bob has more than desire now. He has an obsession. Thus, once again, Aaron is looking at agents post-choice and demanding that their actions be determined. I have no objection. But this hardly proves anything pre-choice, which is where I am interesting in having an incompatibilist free will.

Aaron wraps up by noting two reasons why he is a determinist. First, he apparently used to be an indeterminist and lost an argument to an atheist. I’m sorry to hear that I lost an ally. I just want to note that although incompatibilism is currently a minority view in philosophical circles, it is highly respected. The reason for compatibilism being favored is that naturalism is favored in academia, and as I noted, naturalism seems to entail determinism. I’'m not saying that Aaron is a closet naturalist. I am noting that if Aaron is correct, naturalism offers moral responsibility, as well. It seems to me that naturalism cannot offer moral responsibility for incompatibilist reasons.

The second reason Aaron cites is that Christianity requires compatibilism. I generally try to stay out of theological debates, as I have found them to be filled with polemics. I will say a few things here. I am a Protestant like Aaron, but I believe that the Bible requires incompatibilism. I believe this because free will is necessary for moral responsibility.

UPDATE (4/21/05 8:40am): Aaron has posted a reply to this post. You may find it here.